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TAXATION AMOUNT RECEIVED FOR FUTURE
DAMAGES
A recent case, dealt with whether an amount received by a
taxpayer from a motion picture company as a release of all
claims against the company was income on which the individual
must pay tax. Plaintiff was the manager of a baseball dub
about which a motion picture was made by a Hollywood pro-
ducer. The manager was presented in an unfavorable light,
which showed him fighting with and cursing the fans and
players. The plaintiff, although his name was not mentioned in
the movie, felt uneasy about its effect on his reputation. The
company, for $2,500, obtained a release of any and all claims
he might have against the company. Plaintiff petitioned for a
refund of the tax paid on this amount, claiming it to be liqui-
dated damages for injury to his reputation and invasion of his
privacy, and therefore exempt under income tax law. The
Government contended the amount was received for services
rendered and was income to the Plaintiff.
In denying plaintiff's petition for a refund, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that the money
was received as a payment for possible future damages, not
damages actually sustained, and was fully taxable.
The decision in the Meyer case above is merely an extension
of existing tax philosophy and is consistent with the few
tax rulings and decisions on this particular subject. It is
difficult to see why the Government attempted to show the
payment in the Meyer case was for services rendered ( a very
weak case, as the Government conceded), as the Revenue
Service could clearly have won its case on the basis of past
decisions by contending, as the District Court itself found,
that the payment was "an attempt to pay liquidated damages
for possible future injuries to (Meyer's) reputation, resulting
from invasions of his privacy."
In general, damages are excluded from income on which the
individual must pay tax, where it is compensation for some
I Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (1959).
RECENT CASES
actual unjury to the taxpayer and where the compensation is
designed to make the taxpayer whole.2 There can be no in-
come tax because there is no income, no profit, to the taxpayer.
He is in precisely the same position before his injury as he is
after the receipt of such damages. 3 It is settled that no tax will
be due on money received as damages for libel and slander;4
breach of promise to marry; 5 defamation of character or
alienation of iffection; 0 loss of life; 7or annulment of marriage
on the ground of fraud and deceit. 8 Formerly, it was held9
that damages received for the surrender of the custody of a
minor child by a parent for consideration was exempt from in-
come, but this doctrine now appears to have been overruled 10
through recognition that such a payment is given for the re-
linquishment of a right presently possessed, for a future period,
and is not a damage payment. No wrong has been committed
which the damages attempt to make whole; the payment is
for giving up a legal right. Compensation for the loss of
personal rights, as where the taxpayer receives a payment from
the United States Government under the War Claims Act of
1948 for violation, while the taxpayer was a prisoner of war, of
personal rights guaranteed under the Geneva Convention, also
is non-taxable. 11 This should be distinguished from a con-
tractual surrender of a legal right, as the surrender of the
custody of a child, or a contract to refrain from competition,
the payment for which does represent income.12 Again,
the payment made here for the surrender of the right is not
an attempt to make the taxpayer whole, but represents com-
2 C. A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
8 Central R. Co. of N.J. v. Comm'r., 79 F. 2d 697,698 (1935).
4 C. A. Hawkins, supra note 2.
5 Mrs. Lyde McDonald, 9 B.T.A. 1340 (1928).
6 Sol. Op. 132, C.B.June 1922, p. 92.
7IT 2420, C.B.Dec. 1928, p. 123.
8 IT 1852, C.B. Dec. 1923, p. 66.
9 Sol. Op. 132, supra note 6.
10 Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (1943).
"1 Rev. Rul. 55-132, C.B. 1955-1, p. 213.
12 Central R. Co. of NJ., supra note 3; Ehrlich v. Higgins, supra note 10.
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pensation paid to induce the taxpayer to give up something
and, especially where no property right is transferred,'3
constitutes income.
The Supreme Court attempts to determine the nature of the
item for which the damages are a substitute, in order to pass on
their taxable status. 14 If the amount received as damages is
purely compensatory, for actual damage sustained, it is non-
taxable. If, however, no damage was sustained, or the payment
is in excess of such damage, or is in exchange for the taxpayer
giving up some legal right, then the taxpayer is not merely
made whole but is in a better pecuniary position, and such
payment is taxable to the extent of such excess. In general,
double, treble and punitive damages are held to constitute
income to the recipient, as they represent payment for which the
taxpayer has suffered nothing, and ordinary damages have
presumably already compensated the taxpayer for his injury. 15
Thus, the decision in the Meyer case '6 is consistent with
Ehrlich v. Higginsl and prior decisions relating to the taxability
of amounts received as damages, and merely extends existing
rulings to their logical application in the case of payments
received as damages for future injuries. It is highly improbable
that the courts will ever open the door for the receipt of tax-
free income under the guise of damage payments for future
injuries which may not occur. The taxpayer must be able to
show that he has in fact suffered some actual injury which the
damage payment attempts to make whole in order to exclude
such a payment from gross income.
J. J. H.
13 Beals' Estate v. Comm'r., 82 F. 2d 268 (1936); Cox v. Helvering, 71 F. 2d
987 (1934).
14 Hort v. Comm'r., 313 U.S. 28, 61 S.Ct. 757, (1941).
15 Comm'r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co. and William Goldman Theatres, Inc., 348
U.S. 426, 75 S.Ct. 473 (1955).
16 Meyer v. United States, supra note 1.
17 Ehrlich v. Higgins, supra note 10.
